This post summarizes my impressions of a document identified by Austin Bay as part of his series of pointers to the Harmony database of declassified and occasionally translated documents that we’ve captured from Al Qaeda. The document itself is about forty-five pages and not a fast read.
I think this “lessons learned” is a worthwhile read. An organization with these lessons learned for a failed operation would have improved in a manner that fits the Al Qaeda of 2001-2. The document also helps remove the mystique of the unseen terrorist; these people are human and think about warfare in terms that are understandable by a student of warfare. Learning from them like this will help us kill or neutralize them more effectively.
Assumptions
- The document is truly a captured AQ doc
- The doc accurately summarizes the views of an AQ member
- The doc information is as accurate as a single staffer writing a lessons learned can be.
Background — what I knew before reading the doc
In 2002 I poked a classmate of mine hard about her dealings with Syria. Why not push harder for things you clearly believe? Why not take the stand now?
Her response was “Hamat”. Also called Hama or Hamah, it’s a little town near the middle of the country. In the late seventies and early ’80′s the Middle East was dealing with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood by typical tyrannical means–Qutb tortured and imprisoned, Hadeed tortured and later assassinated, repression in Egypt and Syria, et cetera. Hama had an uprising in 1982, and the Syrian government did as the Russians did in Chechnya a decade back–go in with guns and block all information coming out of the region while the operation was in progress.
According to my Syrian friend, the ‘operation’ was to perform a massacre. Nobody knows how many men, women and children were killed, but tens of thousands seems to be the order of magnitude. The operation was brutal on a scale to rival atrocities in World War Two, as far as anyone can tell.
My earlier understanding was that the uprising was Kurdish in nature. The document has other things to say about it.
Document Summary
The AQ operation started as early as 1976; the massacre happened in 1982. These operations are long term deals. The hirabist side (heh) was a mix of AQ, MB and locals like Attalieaa; the other side was the Syrian government.
Operational security was key to the failure of the campaign. Key captures by the Syrian government related to a MB coup attempt gave the Syrian government the information that caused them to massacre Hama.
The document has several sections. The first section describes the situation and structure of the players affiliated with AQ.
- A description of the players (as AQ sees them, and after the debacle).
- A short background from about 1970 onward.
- Critique of the overall character of the operation,
- Critique focusing on the Attalieaa (Syrian internal jihadi group) structure and what worked and didn’t,
- Critique focusing on Muslim Brotherhood structure,
- Lessons learned from survivors in the field.
The next chapter is “Lessons learned from the obstacles facing military jihad.” The numbering can get confusing, but the doc structure is: AQ, Attalieaa, MB. Sort of.
The lessons identified seem to be points that AQ took on board. Changing the cell structure to improve OPSEC, focusing more on political and information war aspects, and changing the sustainability of the fighting units all seem to be things AQ is strong at in 2002 that they complain here is what caused failure in Syria. The “franchise model” of terrorism didn’t spring fully formed from here, but you can see its beginnings. The military organization recommended has three branches: “known”, meaning fighters that are out there, “unknown”, guys with fewer skills and more covert but enablers and fighters of opportunity like the doctor in Iraq that was killing police secretly, and “abroad”, loggies and intel guys that might make one look at CAIR with a more jaundiced eye.
It’s clear that tyrannies, which are focused on regime survival no matter which group is trying to overthrow them, are very good at suppressing dissent using tools we can’t use. The extended family of a AQ fighter was at risk in a way they aren’t against the Americans, for instance.
The Best Insult I’ve Heard In A While
From a discussion of the capabilities of one of the last leaders left on the ground:
I do not doubt Adnan Akla’s loyalty and integrity as a leader, nor do I doubt his courage. I also have not doubt that he lacks the wisdom to benefit from those two characteristics.
Links Of Note Between Organizations
- Jordan’s intel was helping Syria’s intel.
- Iraq trained AQ. Iraq trained Attalieaa. Iraq provided tons of weapons to AQ. AQ was not happy that MB linked closely to secular Iraq and consulted with them. Iraq ran radio stations for MB pointed at Syria. AQ believes Attalieaa was overly dependent on Iraq for support. Cadres moved to Iraq. Iraq security services spied on AQ efforts after aid was terminated in 1980. MB members got documents forged for them in Iraq. There were military training camps in Iraq where families lived. AQ blames MB for selling their operations down the river and convincing Iraq to withdraw support.
- MB and AQ relations were severely damaged by this debacle. A schism in 1989 weakened MB. (I would like more schisms, please.)
Humanizing The Enemy
This is a good read in terms of recognizing that there are human beings we’re fighting, not shadowy IED planters with no weaknesses we can exploit.
That’s about all I can add. Any campaign planners out there want to show me what I’m missing?