Chapomatic

December 31, 2005

Hirabah

Filed under: — Chap @ 7:03 pm

The concept of hirabah might be a meme worth propagating. Recently I’ve noticed some people discussing what I mentioned last week–”moderate Muslims”–and how to keep us from getting blown up right proper. I’ll describe some articles I’ve recently discovered or seen in the last few days, mention what this harabah thing is, and make a general observation or two. I hope someone who actually can do something about it reads this post or at least thinks about the same things.

Executive Summary

  1. Given that a center of gravity for our enemy is related to their ability to recruit new dopes, it is in the West’s best interest to prevent that recruitment or at least change the environment in which dopes grow. I characterize a little of the environment and mention some possible means of improvement.
  2. Some of the recruitment is a perversion of otherwise noble concepts.
  3. We won’t know how much we affect public opinion until a sudden cascade appears. It is very hard for someone in certain situations to be able to do and say the right thing. We have the ability to influence those situations.
  4. I link to various calls to action: one from the Wall Street Journal, one organization’s categorization of which Muslims are using this word hirabah to refer to who we’re fighting, and a few ideas on information warfare.

Caveat Before You Click

I haven’t taken the time to polish this up yet, in the spirit of “a post published is better than a better post not published”. I plan to update this, and when I do I’ll put a little “update” thing at the end.

I think perhaps the enemy is shifting to a slightly different form of attack. Iraq’s got a inbound force flow that results in a sustained level of slodeydopes roughly equivalent to the force numbers of bombers in Northern Ireland, order of magnitude a thousand or two bad guys. Eventually we’ll start making it a lot harder to flow into Iraq, and other targets will appear softer–perhaps the comments about Zarqawi’s minions posturing for Euro work is true, perhaps not. A shift in attack location or method may imply an opportunity to interdict the flow of recruits and thus shrink the numbers of the Legion of Splodeydopes.

(I use my silly neologism Legion of Splodeydopes for two reasons. First, I feel like it. Second, humiliation, belittling, and marginalization through ridicule and humor is a useful weapon against both totalitarians and people who take themselves too seriously while they try to kill us.)

At some point even the most groupthinking Legionnaire will understand that their efforts over the last four years have resulted not in deferred success but in actual short- and long-term failure. The latest effort to incite a General Giap-style focus on American withdrawal isn’t quite working today despite the best efforts of well-intentioned Americans who succeeded in 1972–and that withdrawal was the latest initiative the Legion was counting on. Failure is riding the weak horse, and a failing force doesn’t get as many recruits.

The Legion of Splodeydopes is a franchise, like an evil version of Subway Sandwiches. There’s the unified sales campaign, and there’s usually tomatoes for your sandwich no matter where the store is. The stores look a little bit different depending on who owns the store. Being corporate, killing the CEO won’t stop the company, and franchises may still operate independently even when the parent company goes under. Legionnaires in Alexandria may be different people from Legionnaires in Madrid, and both might hate each other, but until mutual goals are met they aren’t exactly going to spend all their time killing each other when there are decadent Westerners to kill instead.

The LoS needs new blood. That blood is both theirs and that of others, since “if it bleeds it leads” in the papers, and mass media is very important for the LoS. (Corporate needs its advertising.) So the Legion needs new dopes. Dopes aren’t necessarily going to arrive by themselves in the amounts the LoS needs to establish the caliphate in this failing environment, so they need advertising, some successes, and maybe different resourcing for their dopes. Problem for us is, their idea of advertising is blowing up something big near a TV camera. (An off-topic example: I remember seeing posters on sale of all the newspaper front pages after 9/11. There is no way to buy that kind of advertising, none. But there is a way to get your message out with that kind of penetration–just kill where the press is.)

Just as one of our centers of gravity for this war is our own popular will to use force and not just threaten same, one of the centers of gravity for the Legion Of Splodeydopes is the mindset of their cause as a noble and worthwhile and honorable thing. It’s easier to add Legionnaires if being a Legionnaire is the Most Important, Bestest Thing To Do. Aspects of nobility abound to aid recruitment, but those aspects are perverted. One example is a fellow who had some ideas about the downtrodden, was a dissident and jailed and tortured because of it in a totalitarian society, but whose ideas propagated after his death. There are several of those fellows, and so far it sounds like I’m describing someone good. Unfortunately there’s plenty of evil in the message of guys like Qutb and Wahab. This discussion of Qutb’s life from a translator’s interview gets the point across. (Godwin’s Law preemption here with a discussion that both explains the logical fallacy and takes all the funny out of it.)

There have been several good “who are these guys” articles to which I can refer. To summarize: They are different from terrorists we have seen before (this is counterintuitive for many people and to prove it takes a few minutes). They aren’t poor, not necessarily preteen, and they tend to be recently deeply faithful or newly converted. Peters categorizes these guys as apocalyptic terrorists, as being different from terrorists that, say, a Western European circa 1982 might have seen. He described his model as follows, from my notes, all mistakes mine:

Practical terrorism vs. Apocalyptic terrorism

We’re used to them

Not used to before September. American equivalent may have been John Brown.

Earthly aims with limits

Aims always increase. Aims always reach or surpass the limits of language.

End state thought of in terms of people related states

Have a vision, even though terrorist may not know it himself

To deal: they want to be chief of state and thus can be negotiated

“Fall in love” with notion of Apocalypse

Ringleaders passionate but not psychotic, and mellow with time.

No Book of Revelations in Koran, but that’s the thinking style

Male and female.

Almost always male.

Why is this different from what we normally see as terrorism?

Apocalyptic movements tend to appear in times of great change. One example he cited was post-Reformation 1520’s Europe and he drew parallels to the current situation. The basic idea: When the worldview changed away from traditional Catholic life with the reformationist schism, the shock of such a big change was difficult. Some bands of people appeared vowing to “cleanse through blood” and only stopped in their nihilist terror campaign when killed to the last man. With global information flow, people in religiously repressive regimes saw the better world out there, and this has been quite a shock.

Now a person doesn’t normally wake up one day and decide it’s time to go die for God by killing off some more of God’s children. There is a socialization process for many of the fighters we see, and a path that people take from being normal person to evil beast.

Some of the primordial soup for the people that join the Bad Team incluse such factors as the media environment, the conventional wisdom, the zeal of the recent convert, the rite of passage, and a person’s need to do something greater than oneself. I’d like to superficially mention some things I’ve noticed that if implemented might help our cause out a little bit.

Media Environment

By this I don’t mean the traditional bashing of TV news. I mean the everyday messages someone gets in a susceptible environment. A kid growing up Palestinian gets a full head of children’s TV shows of how wonderful it is to strap on the ol’ Semtex; a kid in Lebanon gets Hezbollah music videos with the booms timed to rap music with the message. A kid watching the Friday sermons on TV gets rather more strident rhetoric than, say, the 700 Club. It’s easier to walk around Berkeley, California in a “Bush ‘08″ t-shirt than it is to own a Bible in Saudi Arabia.

Living in a totalitarian culture makes it harder to go off message. In that previous post I quoted approvingly a fellow that was characterizing the American mosque culture as having a similar power disparity for new immigrants.

To address this takes some measures that aren’t necessarily military, aren’t necessarily what USAID would do. The Department of State is starting to work on the second tier dialogue, with things like book tours for their Arabic Book Program, intended to reach the elites in those cultures. But even this useful effort is weakened by gaps in interagency communication; how many military folks know about an Arabic Book Program? More importantly, which groups in the Defense Department, like troops doing the Pakistan humanitarian work or any of our other presence operations, have access to large quantities of Frederich Hayek’s book, or Thomas Paine, or Walter Russell Mead, or Madeline L’Engle’s books, translated in Arabic? Some brainstorm-level ideas that might be of use include a theme of reducing information control by our enemies–which runs against the American ideal hosted in our First Amendment. Until one considers the loss of life as a right that might just be bigger. In any case, better people than I need to have public discussion about things like:

  • Facilitate children’s programming in Palestine. Find an imam like Fred Rogers. Propagate it.
  • Identify and kill, capture or neutralize information warfare agents working against us. This is icky; we don’t exactly send hit squads for David Duke even though he’s a hate mongering Nazi with a tendency to spout off about Americans in foreign countries. On the other hand Duke is working within the system irritatingly but nonviolently. The guys making splodeydope music videos are murdering innocents and making high production quality snuff films for the entertainment of our enemies. Resolve what to do when an ISP based in Utah is hosting an al-Qaeda website. Make the civil liberties versus civil safety argument now, not when something about it pops up in the NYT when politically inconvenient.
  • Ensure governments understand that their Friday sermons put out by government-approved and paid hatemongers are the responsibility of who pays for them–and then force the reduction of financial and military aid when they don’t listen, against the wishes of our own bureaucracy which would much rather maintain status quo.
  • Use the power that got us Dallas reruns all over the world and use it–and note well that government does not do that; government gets us something like “Farm Implements Today” or “How To Save String”. I do not know how to do this.

Conventional Wisdom

The beautiful convergence of professional victimhood, multicultural language, and blaming everything including the weather on the Israeli-Palestinian situation is part of the meme pool in which a dope swims. The conventional wisdom for a Marin youngster won’t necessarily be the same one for a kid in Omaha. The Wahabi in Saudi Arabia have managed to infect academia rather handily, given time and billions of dollars. I won’t get too into the details of the mindset about which I’m complaining but will at least mention it.

For a person inside the environment that produces dopes, it can be difficult to publicly do the right thing. It takes much more courage to say what one thinks than people can stand. The situation that causes people to not be able to speak out is a loss of freedom, and is powerful but brittle. The apparent change in opinion can appear in a preference cascade–meaning until you get to that point where you’re near succeeding, you don’t see much change. That’s what Sharansky’s talking about in his book.

Abdurrahman Wahid has a WSJ op-ed that talks about a possible path to improving the situation. It isn’t an easy one.

All too many Muslims fail to grasp Islam, which teaches one to be lenient towards others and to understand their value systems, knowing that these are tolerated by Islam as a religion. The essence of Islam is encapsulated in the words of the Quran, “For you, your religion; for me, my religion.” That is the essence of tolerance. Religious fanatics–either purposely or out of ignorance–pervert Islam into a dogma of intolerance, hatred and bloodshed. They justify their brutality with slogans such as “Islam is above everything else.” They seek to intimidate and subdue anyone who does not share their extremist views, regardless of nationality or religion. While a few are quick to shed blood themselves, countless millions of others sympathize with their violent actions, or join in the complicity of silence.

This crisis of misunderstanding–of Islam by Muslims themselves–is compounded by the failure of governments, people of other faiths, and the majority of well-intentioned Muslims to resist, isolate and discredit this dangerous ideology. The crisis thus afflicts Muslims and non-Muslims alike, with tragic consequences. Failure to understand the true nature of Islam permits the continued radicalization of Muslims world-wide, while blinding the rest of humanity to a solution which hides in plain sight.

The most effective way to overcome Islamist extremism is to explain what Islam truly is to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Without that explanation, people will tend to accept the unrefuted extremist view–further radicalizing Muslims, and turning the rest of the world against Islam itself.

Accomplishing this task will be neither quick nor easy. In recent decades, Wahhabi/Salafi ideology has made substantial inroads throughout the Muslim world. Islamic fundamentalism has become a well-financed, multifaceted global movement that operates like a juggernaut in much of the developing world, and even among immigrant Muslim communities in the West. To neutralize the virulent ideology that underlies fundamentalist terrorism and threatens the very foundations of modern civilization, we must identify its advocates, understand their goals and strategies, evaluate their strengths and weaknesses, and effectively counter their every move. What we are talking about is nothing less than a global struggle for the soul of Islam.

He’s not the only one thinking in these terms. The Center for Understanding Islam is out of New Jersey, two data that would normally concern me. But just take a look at this pdf here. With this FAQ they’re trying to gather knowledge of Islam as they understand it and change minds in ways that further an Islam that isn’t hijacked by apocalyptic, nihilist dopes. Another effort they are making gave this post its title.

The term hirabah refers to public terrorism in a war against society and civilization. In legal terminology it is defined as “spreading mischief in the land,” but its precise meaning, as defined by Professor Khalid Abou el Fadl, is “killing by stealth and targeting a defenseless victim in a way intended to cause terror in society.” This is the Islamic definition of terrorism. It is the very opposite of jihad.

The term hirabah comes from the root hariba, a verb that means to become angry and enraged. By derivation the noun harb (pl. hurub) means variously “war” and “enemy.” Over the centuries, and especially during the Crusades, the hurub al salibiya, extremists have extended the meaning of this term, harb, to demonize all non-Muslims. They came to designate the entire world not controlled by Muslim rulers as the dar al harb, the House of the Enemy or the House of War, as distinct from the dar al islam, the House of Islam.

The modern extremist, Sayyid Qutb, perverted the teachings of his mentor, Hassan al Banna, by proclaiming: “There is only one place on earth that can be called the House of Islam, and it is that place where an Islamic state is established and the shari’ah is the authority and God’s laws are observed. … The rest of the world is the House of War.“

Hirabah, not jihad. Got it. Now how to implement this meme?

There’s always a chance that trying to get the meme into common usage will fail. An example of a failed meme to me might be the effort some folks made to change the term “suicide bomber” to “homicide bomber”– only the (Fox News, mostly) faithful use that term. (I prefer the lizardoid term splodeydope, myself.)

The other interesting thing about the above link is that people are individually getting called out on their position on this concept.

In keeping with related materials shared with you recently, here is my ever-growing list of quotations from a variety of experts in support of the “Hirabah” (unholy war, war against society) frame of reference for al Qaeda-style terrorism.

Note that such a list doesn’t prevent people who say one thing to one audience and another to its dopey audience (MEMRI has enraged doubletalkers because of its removal of the language barrier in its translations.) It also doesn’t prevent saying one thing and doing another. But it does outline the odd position of guys like Tariq Ramadan, who got refused access to the US for classified reasons but managed to be the keynote speaker at a Fletcher alumni event in London. Is he or isn’t he? And if I have to ask, why is the answer not obvious?

Changing the conventional wisdom is one key to Dope Prevention. Strategy Page mentions that a strategic error by the LoS turned its nominal havens into places where Legionnaires aren’t exactly the Best Example Of Faithful Living. This isn’t the only thing that needs done–more openness in closed groups and information defense would certainly help–but what Strategy Page reports is useful.

The main source of Islamic terrorism, Saudi Arabia, has turned on Islamic terrorism with a vengeance. Last week, Abdel-Rahman Mohammed al Suwailmi, the most wanted Islamic terrorist in the kingdom was captured. This happened after al Suwailmi went on a one-man terror spree, killing five policemen in drive-by shootings. This was the only kind of attack al Suwailmi could get together. The Saudis have a posted list of the 36 most wanted Islamic terrorists in Saudi Arabia. But 21 of those are believed to be out of the country (hiding in places like Iraq, Yemen, Europe, Syria or Iran). Of the fifteen terrorists in the kingdom, eight have been killed or captured. This is the second “most wanted” list, consisting largely of second-string al Qaeda operatives. Al Suwailmi, for example, was only 23 years old, and his main activity was propaganda and recruitment.

…many Malaysians can still maintain enthusiasm for Islamic terrorism because they have not seen it up close. This kind of experience turned Iraqis and Jordanians, previously major supporters of Islamic terrorism, into al Qaeda haters.

Islamic terrorists are aware of this image problem, and there is a, at times, public debate among the leadership over the need to avoid attacks that kill Moslems, especially women and children. Another tactic that works, is good works. Charity projects are good for the image of Islamic terrorists. This has worked in the Palestinian territories (Hamas), Lebanon (Hizbollah), and Pakistan (many groups). However, the “charity” tactic also limits your choice of targets. For the moment, Palestine, Lebanon and Pakistan remain the main training grounds, and support bases for Islamic terrorism. Getting at these bases is difficult, because of the protective “good will” the Islamic terrorists have created.

The Recent Convert

Didja ever notice that some of the more vehement righty people used to be lefty people? Or that new folks in a group tend to be more emphatic about the concepts to which they newly confess? Or that recent converts to Islam pop up often in the list of Exploded Dopes?

There is no papal organization, and thus no effective way of internally policing all centers of Islamic faith to ensure the new guys aren’t coopted into evil deeds. But one can see the sources of conversion and find a way to ensure a newcomer to one’s faith understands that faith properly. This is an internal religious matter since we’re talking culture inside the faith but us outsiders can facilitate this through external policing of such folks as prison proselytizers. Again, an issue that needs public and reasonable discussion about three years ago, but needs done. (We’re not good with this even when the newly faithful aren’t as interested in blowing up little kids–see the foofraw over military chaplains in both directions over the last two years.)

The Rite Of Passage

I am certain that someone smarter than me has identified a causal link between the lack of meaningful work, lack of rites of passage, and such fun as riots in France. (Some folks have argued that the WWII draft inculcated a common culture as a unified low-level language. There is that, but a draft is a different argument not for here.)

One can definitely see masses of young folks without something Important they are allowed to do in these totalitarian countries. Just look at all the guys in Saudi with bachelor’s degrees and nothing important to do. This is not just a waste–it’s an incentive to blow up the source of one’s frustration.

The Highest Goals Perverted

This is the thing that whats-his-face from he TV show Politically Incorrect was trying to think about when he said dumb things after 9/11. Military folks understand the “greater love hath no man than to lay down his life for his comrades” concept–and that concept can be a noble thing. That nobility gets twisted. Consider this MEMRI translation (RealPlayer video) of a Cairo professor’s discussion about suicide bombers.

Host: Let us begin at the beginning and ask, what is the psychological structure of the martyr? Who is the martyr? Who is this 17-year-old girl, planning to marry in 2 or 3 months, a beauty queen, who straps on an explosive belt and turns herself into a human bomb? What is the psychological structure of the martyr?

Prof. ‘Adel Sadeq: The psychological structure is that of a person who loves life. Praise Allah, he is seeking death! This is the thing that may appear peculiar to people who see the human soul as the most supreme thing. They are incapable of understanding this because their cultural structure has no concepts such as self-sacrifice and honor. These concepts do not exist in some cultures and thus they find themselves, in the face of these models (suicide bombers), in a state of denial, in a state of total denial they think that this is impossible, and therefore they begin to present idiotic and silly interpretations.

Okay, here are some quick things very wrong with this formulation.

  • A talking point implied here is closely related to the previous statements that we Westerners would lose because we loved life when the glorious fighters loved death. This is a misunderstanding of Americans in particular, as the Jacksonian strain of political will, and the military culture, understands that sometimes it’s time to die. We aren’t as inclined to spend our lives for nothing, but we do die for ideas. As Peters put it in an interview about the Civil War, people on both sides decided that their differences were unresolvable and it was God’s will for the winner to be determined through warfare. I see that the argument that Americans are soft and won’t die in battle is being challenged, but it is still prevalent.
  • Suicidal folks tend to heterodyne–there’s a feedback loop where people tend to spiral into a decision to kill themselves. Sure, it’s easier to make that decision when taught that this particular death is Very Important, but it still requires effort to get to that point.
  • The formulation that the Western culture has no concept of self-sacrifice or honor is a powerful driver to that feedback loop. If you’re the Chosen Few, or the chosen one, then you must do what you need to, right?

Later in the transcript there are core concepts taken for granted that feed this evil.

Earlier I mentioned Qutb, who helped found the Brotherhood. This perversion of nobility works for organizations too. It’s a lot easier to be evil snots like Hizbollah when Hizbollah controls the garbage collection–even the Mafia got respect because making the Mafia happy allowed the buildings to get built. The other thing mixing good works with evil does is make it harder to identify the bad guys (when inside the environment) and kill them off (outside the environment).

Some Kind Of Grand Conclusion

Yeah, I owe you one. But I ran out of time and will update if I ever think of one that isn’t lame. Suffice it to say that we’ve got some hard decisions we need to make, some hard actions that will need to be taken, and we need to enable those folks who are caught in the middle while crushing the ones that would like to kill us.

I look forward to the sound of the crickets on this overlong post.


First Update: Thanks very much to Little Green Footballs for being kind enough to link. Some very good links and comments appear below, including an Army War College article that was the genesis of the “apocrpyhal terrorist” concept. This post added to Mudville’s open trackback. Welcome Alidaders. Blonde joke folks, welcome too.

And the great Den Beste may even have read it. So I’ve got that going for me. Which is nice.

Update: Sisyphean Musings has an interesting quote from a Pentagon correspondent.

20 Responses to “Hirabah”

  1. CDR Salamander Says:

    Long? I processed the “kill them off.” Then again, I’m fairly binary.

  2. John deVille Says:

    FWIW, I found the analyis to be fascinating and incisive and the solutions creative. Some minor point and a couple of questions.

    We’ve argued before over whether to paint the current wave of Muslim terrorism with a broad brush. I’ll concede that to me it makes sense to put a lot of Muslim terrorists, esp AQ, in the “splodeydope” box and subject them to the Chapomatic treatments. But I think that still leaves a lot left outside that box and that quite different solutions than info war and/or selective terminations of bad guys will get us where we want to be — the solutions will have to be material as well as ideological. And, just as important, we will have to behave in an ideologically/morally/politically consistent fashion. That goes to the heart of our credibility and without unassailable credibility, all other info war manuevers will be for naught — they will be seen as cynical, Machiavellian, self-serving actions and nothing more. And if we don’t deal with the non-splodeydope terrorists then we will fail to deprive the splodeydope variety of the moral authority and/or ideological fuel (whether we want to see it as legit or not) they usurp from the nons.

    I certainly agree with your criticism of Prof Sadeq, at least from a historical perspective. When my students make the Sadeq case, I immediately fall back to Pickett’s Charge, complete with a reading from Faulkner’s Intruder’s in the Dust:

    “For every Southern boy fourteen years old, not once but whenever he wants it, there is the instant when it’s still not yet two oclock on that July afternoon in 1863, the brigades are in position behind the rail fence, the guns are laid and ready in the woods and the furled flags are already loosened to break out and Pickett himself with his long oiled ringlets and his hat in one hand probably and his sword in the other looking up the hill waiting for Longstreet to give the word and it’s all in the balance, it hasn’t happened yet, it hasn’t even begun yet, it not only hasn’t begun yet but there is stll time for it not to begin against that position and those circumstances which made more men than Garnett and Kemper and Armstead and Wilcox look grave yet it’s going to begin, we all know that, we have come too far with too much at stake and that moment doesn’t need even a fourteen-year-old boy to think This time. Maybe this time with all this much to lose and all this much to gain: Pennsylvania, Maryland, the world, the golden dome of Washington itself to crown with desperate and unbelievable victory the desperate gamble, the cast made two years ago…. ”

    That quote and 30 minutes from the film Gettysburg on the same historical moment makes the point.

    The two questions:

    (1) Does the State Dept have anything at all in place in the manner that you’ve described?

    (2) If such a program as you’ve proposed were to be implemented, aside from the neutralizing activities, who should operate the program — Pentagon or State Dept? Why?

    Happy New Year

  3. enrevanche Says:

    Hirabah and the Splodeydopes

    To ring in the New Year, Chap’s got a long, but worthwhile, post on the concept of hirabah.

    What’s hirabah? It means “terrorism,” basically–the killing of innocents–and is the word that modern, moderate and peaceful Muslims use to describe the…

  4. The Politburo Diktat » Blog Archive » Hirabah, not Jihad Says:

    [...] Chapomatic – Hirabah [...]

  5. Searchlight Crusade Says:

    Jihad versus Hirabah

    Enrevanche sent me an email about a Chapomatic article and his own response on the d…

  6. Curt Says:

    Chap;

    1) Congrats!

    2) Standby for heavy bandwidth use! You MADE LGF!

  7. John deVille Says:

    I see that my homepage — aldaily.com — just linked the Wahid article this morning in its Essays & Opinion section.

  8. chap Says:

    John,

    You’ve got some substantive questions I need to address. Thanks for them. I’ll do the easy ones first.

    (1) Does the State Dept have anything at all in place in the manner that you’ve described?

    The new State shop, S/CRS, is the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. It’s interdisciplinary and looks promising. But it’s tiny, I’m probably the only O-4 in Navy who’s even heard of it, and it’s doomed to fail without significant push from lots of places if only because of the number of rice bowls involved.

    (2) If such a program as you’ve proposed were to be implemented, aside from the neutralizing activities, who should operate the program — Pentagon or State Dept? Why?

    Don’t know, but would argue it doesn’t matter much. State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, Homeland Defense, et cetera are have executive branch leadership, so there’s at least one spot common to them. The government can do the governmental stuff okay, and I’d expect any functioning stucture should work.

    The question behind the question is: how does a national effort move forward besides the governmental part? How does business get involved? All the Joseph Nye-approved Wielders Of Soft Power? How do the second- and third-tier intellectual shops do their thing? How do we as a nation influence a youth culture in another nation–on purpose?

    I’ll merely gloss over the other, harder question–but here’s a stab at it.

    Let’s posit that someone shooting at me is a combatant. Which of the following also is a combatant?

    The person handing the ammo to the shooter

    The person housing the shooter

    The person financing the shooter.

    Those answers are pretty well hashed out and have a generally accepted answer (although not always black and white because of differing circumstances). What I accept as a given is that the aid and support to morale and recruiting done by the Hezbollah exploding music video needs to be considered in the above terms. Because this can be a gray area, and because we haven’t gotten as violent as we could be, our enemy has taken the opportunity to work within the seams and exploit our moral barriers. (The discussion of exploiting our moral reluctance to violence is a theme that could get its own post and is one of the ways wars get more ugly over time.)

    There is clearly a tension between civil rights and the right to not be blown up. There is also something more at play than First Amendment considerations when a paid stringer just happens to magically be at the site of where people are killing my comrades prepped for the most photogenic boom.

    This dilemma is of a continuum, not just a set ethical piece, and must be solved in situ in real time without the luxury of thinking about it in the event.

    I think that that Hezbollah exploding music video guy needs to not be happy about his efforts–and this isn’t a law enforcement issue, it’s acts of war.

  9. Dodgeblogium : Jihad vs Hirabah Says:

    [...] Read it; its long but fascinating and with lots to think about. [...]

  10. Curt Keays Says:

    Chap- You are one of my regular reads- I found this Middle East Forum on a seach I did about the difference between strategy and tactics. More of how to defeat the Harabi MEME

  11. Inside Larry's head Says:

    A fight for the Heart and Soul of Islam

    Barry over at Enrevanche points out a new movement to make Islamic Terrorists no longer Jihadi’s or Mujahadin but rather hirabah which sounds pretty close to Harab. I think we may be seeing a strong movement in the muslim world to vote the Terrorists…

  12. badbob Says:

    Your proposals sound sort of like “stuff” that Karen Hughes and others have continued to try with little success over the last three years, but I appreciate the thought that went into it. Second tier on several fronts….I like your proactive approach. I could support it.

    That is, as long as we continue to focus on what CDR Salamander says- ““kill them off.” Then again, I’m fairly binary.” Ditto.

    I was shocked at the “homocide-suicide” attacks of 9-11 and the suicide bombings 2 months earlier in Israel. Post 9-11, I shook the dust off an old book I had bought in the late 1970’s when I realized “they” were an enemy I would most likely have to bomb (which came true). It is called “The Arab Mind” by Ralph Petai – I highly recommend it to all understand the “street” from a cultural standpoint. The self-loathing, jealousy and bedouin heritage mores that Mohammed himself inculcated are all described there. Soon after, like the rest of you, I grappled with R. Peter’s Army War College piece “When Devils Walked the Earth” . My only criticism of that piece is his habit of using anomalies of western history like John Brown and the post Reformation to make his point.

    What about the “THE ASSASSINS OF ALAMUT”? http://www.accampbell.uklinux.net/assassins/

    Plenty of “history repeats itself in there theme”……………and it is Eastern history.

    Re your present day “Legion of Splodeydopes” I still espouse the TAO’s choice “hard kill” over the hearts & minds info/psyops-warfare; but I would gladly support any effort that reduced the “Dope Assembly Line”.

    BTW- A subject I have never read you address: That is “our” response IF (some say when…) , “they” are able to pull off a truly horrendous apocalyptic attack using a nuke in CONUS or effective bio attack that kills tens of thousands or more? Something so horrendous even the moonbat left/MSM cabal couldn’t blame on GW. I have discussed a proportional response to this contingency via email with Mr, Subsunk. What say you? Another time perhaps.

    B2

    B2

  13. chap Says:

    B2,

    Roger your “it’s too squishy” complaint, sort of the other side of the John de Ville argument. I am interested in stopping the guys who haven’t Gone Over To The Dark Side–I don’t mind someone who doesn’t like me as long as he isn’t trying to hurt me, and at some point someone who potentially could have been your enemy might come in handy. Practically, you can’t kill those uncommitted guys off because (1) our politics won’t currently support that level of warfare right now (2) it may well be counterproductive–if someone killed a friend of mine who wasn’t doing anything I’d seriously consider taking up arms against that someone, and the demographics get ugly (3) you want to target with precision and suppressive fire is best for when you’re having your head kept down, not this stuff. (I might think that what you advocate is several morality layers down past what’s publicly acceptable, below “kill the AQ member’s entire extended family”.) To combat the Legion, one has to get into an information war like has been waged against us for quite a while aside from just drifting along.

    What I advocate is not necessarily dispatching Karen Hughes, though it’s nice she’s gone out and done, uh, whatever it is that she’s been doing. The Arabic Book Project is a mosquito-sized improvement. The Pakistan relief effort has a GWOT payoff too. There are some things that could be done that wouldn’t be discussed here–but let’s have that argument now, not when the NYT decides it’s politically inconvenient. The point is not to be all wishy-washy and “why do they hate us” about it but to realize that fighter flow is not just who flies out of Damascus International Airport to Baghdad, it’s also who flies in and who doesn’t fly but supports in other ways. To do this requires more skill sets than how to double tap, although that is a tool that should not be ignored. That’s why organizing a plan to combat this is hard. Information warfare is interdisciplinary. As a general rule trigger pullers don’t grok the squishy stuff; the striped pants guys don’t grok bullets. Foreign area officers and Marines get some of it due to their culture, but they don’t get to deal with countering Qutb’s bastard children on a bigger level because they can’t, not without ignoring their primary job.

    I agreed almost immediately hearing Peters talk about Reformation terror. It fit right. I’ll have to read the Army War College article you cite–I haven’t. Christopher Hitchens’s Atlantic article reviewing a new book about John Brown inadvertently backs up what Peters says, by claiming Brown wasn’t the nut comonly described after the abortive raid but an activist whose goal was driving the country into civil war.

    OT: Forgive me for not publicly opining about options for “if we lose Houston”; it’s a subject I won’t discuss in this forum.

  14. Kathy K Says:

    badbob – “our” response IF has been addressed by a number of people – and I agree with them. Winds of Change just did a roundup on it last month here. I’d advise browsing around the links in that post. Especially the one by Den Beste and Wretchard’s ‘3 Conjectures’. (Assuming you haven’t read all those already and are just interested in Chapomatic’s take.) They are fairly long, but a scan-through will give you the gist.

    Chap, I’d also be interested in your opinion of those articles, if you’ve read (or do read in the future) any of them.

  15. badbob Says:

    Chap,

    All good “thinking stuff” that needs to be explored & implemented.

    I am not hopefull regarding this culture and this this subset of especially Evil ones. Change has not come significantly in a milennia. Sure they can operate a PC and major in EE but that basic mindset is always there…. sorry Muslim World, actions speak louder than rhetoric in my book and I’m sure in yours…

    re “kill the AQ member’s entire extended family”. Great idea! No, just kidding. As an ex-Warrior I do understand the principle of a proportional response our government follows. But the least we can do is keep the Homicide bombers families from enriching themselves after an incident occurs. How about a horses head in the bed?

    re “Devils” you’ve read it I’m sure. Here is a link to the .pdf: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/ceto/when_devils_walk_the_earth.pdf

    re “options for “if we lose Houston” I agree with you 100%. On reflection you are right. It wouldn’t be appropriate. Sorry to put you on the spot.

    kathy- I’ve read Wretchard’s take. Problem is not with an appropriate and proportional response with me, it’s the lack of a clear national strategy or policy, written down and distributed publicly. Personally, I think we need another John Foster Dulles type to create a unique policy to counter this “sword of damocles” hanging over our head…just short of a policy of “Massive Retaliation” I’d venture. But of course absolutely NO ONE wants to discuss this. I hope someone is, somewhere. In my mind the threat of apocalyptic terrorists exploding a nuke (s) is very plausible and needs to be confronted with the same survival instinct the US did confronting the Soviet threat in the 50’s…..

    B2

  16. Sisyphus Says:

    The Media, Military and Iraq: For example, at an excellent panel discussion by the Center for American Progess, Dr. Mohammed Hafez made three recommendations to counter terrorism by homicide (what the media calls suicide) bombers, but would be useful against terrorists in Iraq generally:

    Now, more specifically I think there are things that we can do to begin to contain this problem, not completely eliminate it. The first one is that we should not respond to the strategic demands of suicide terrorists after our campaign of violence. So right now, there’s talk about pulling out of Iraq because weve just taken too many hits and its just not worth it. I think were flirting with disaster if this happens. Youre going to get the bleed-out effect in the same way that happened in Afghanistan when all these Jihadists felt that they had a tremendous victory against the Soviets, and went back home and began to organize their own radical groups.

    If we show that this strategy does not pay and, as the Israelis have shown, that you do not respond to the strategic demands of the groups attacking you, then it becomes futile, and that changes the calculus of organizations.

    Secondly, we need to exploit the excesses of the suicide attacks of late. The fact is that many of these suicide attacks have killed many Muslims, but we haven’t really taken advantage of that. And there are three things here that we can exploit. Suicide attacks, particularly by Islamic extremists, as we’ve – as Bruce pointed out, this is the trend right now, tends to fly in the face of three clear principles in Islam. First one is against suicide, second one is against targeting civilians, and the third one is against killing Muslims. But if you look at suicide attacks today, that’s what theyre doing. They’re people blowing themselves up, they are killing civilians, and they are increasingly killing Muslims.

    And the final thing, as I’ve kind of hinted at earlier, is really we need to focus on the impact. This is the area where we have a great deal of leeway. We need to increase public education at home to show people what the strategy of the suicide terrorists – what their strategy is, and that way we become more resilient in the same with the British have become resilient against IRA attacks and the Israelis have become resilient against Hamas and Islamic Jihad attacks, so I’ll stop.

  17. Jim Guirard Says:

    Today’s lexicons, both Arabic and English, are dominated by al Qaeda’s patently false language of “Jihadi martyrdom” — so-called “Jihad” (holy war) by supposed “mujahiddin” (holy warriors) and “shahiddin” (martyrs) allegedly on their way to a sex-orgy Paradise as a proper reward for killing all of us purported “infidels.” What a pseudo-Islamic scam !!!

    Imagine, please, how much more difficult it will be for bin Laden and his murderous ilk to inspire and to sustain the suicidal zealotry of young Muslims — or the approval of any truly devout and faithful Muslims whatever — once these genocidal irhabis (terrorists) come to be viewed by the Umma (the Muslim World) as mufsidoon (evildoers) engaged in Hirabah (unholy war, forbidden “war against society”) and in murtadd (apostasy) against Allah and, therefore, on their way to Jahannam (Eternal Hellfire), instead. Truth in language and truth in Islam are the solutions.

    JIM GUIRARD — TrueSpeak Institute 703-768-0957 Alexandria, Va.

  18. Chapomatic » More On Hirabah: They Were There First Says:

    [...] On the Hirabah post, I got a comment from Jim Guirard of the TrueSpeak Foundation. Imagine, please, how much more difficult it will be for bin Laden and his ous ilk to inspire and to sustain the suicidal zealotry of young Muslims — or the approval of any truly devout and faithful Muslims whatever — once these genocidal irhabis (terrorists) come to be viewed by the Umma (the Muslim World) as mufsidoon (evildoers) engaged in Hirabah (unholy war, “war against society”) and in murtadd (apostasy) against Allah and, therefore, on their way to Jahannam (Eternal Hellfire), instead. Truth in language and truth in Islam are the solutions. [...]

  19. Searchlight Crusade Says:

    Jihad versus Hirabah…

    Enrevanche sent me an email about a Chapomatic article and his own response on the distinction between Jihad (or “holy war”, a name for war in the name of religion), and hirabah, which to quote The term hirabah refers to……

  20. Chapomatic » I May Be Wrong About The Hirabah Idea Says:

    [...] while back I posted about changing the way we reference splodeydopes and suchlike. That’s a long post, done about [...]

Trackback URL for Hirabah: http://gmapalumni.org/chapomatic/wp-trackback.php?p=1401

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